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Abstract We study the effect that a series of Islamist terrorist attacks across Europe in
2004–2005 had on the integration of Muslim immigrants. Using unique panel data that
oversamples immigrants in the Netherlands, we show that, shortly after the attacks, Muslim
immigrants’ attitudes toward integration worsened significantly compared to those of non-
Muslim immigrants, with no evidence of a negative trend in the attitudes ofMuslims prior to
the attacks. While, in particular, low-educated Muslims became more geographically
segregated and unemployed after the attacks, high-educated Muslims were affected most
negatively in terms of their perceived integration. This decline in perceived integration is
associated with a higher intention to permanently re-migrate to the country of origin.
Keywords Terrorism . Integration .Muslim immigrants
JEL Classification F22 . J15 . R23 . Z13
1 Introduction
Islamist terrorist attacks on Western targets generally raised anti-Muslim feelings across the
Western world. This paper investigates the extent to which the attitudes of Muslim immi-
grants toward integration in their host country are negatively affected by Islamist terrorism,
and examines which groups ofMuslims are affected most negatively by the terrorist attacks.
We use a unique panel dataset from the Netherlands that oversamples immigrants and
contains detailed information on their attitudes and feelings toward their host country. The
dataset consists of two waves. The first wave was collected during 2002–2003, while the
second wave was collected over 2006–2007. Between the two waves, Western Europe
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witnessed the first violent wave of Islamist terrorism since September 11, 2001 (Bakker
2006). This wave began with the Madrid bombings onMarch 11, 2004, which were shown
to have been directed by anAlQaeda-affiliated group, killing 191 people and injuring 1841.1
The wave of attacks ended with the London bombings on July 7, 2005, which were
committed by four Islamist suicide bombers, raised in the UK, leaving 52 people dead,
including the four bombers, with over 700 injured.2
The Netherlands was also heavily affected by this wave of radical Islamist terrorism
when Theo van Gogh, a famous Dutch film director, TV interviewer, and writer, was
murdered on November 2, 2004, by a young man of Moroccan origin who had recently
converted to radical Islam. 3 This attack received enormous media attention and
triggered nationwide outrage against Muslims (Gautier et al. 2009). In the weeks
following the murder, there were several attacks on mosques and other Islamic
institutions in the Netherlands (Gautier et al. 2009). The survey Leefsituatie Allochtone
Stedelingen collected data on city dwellers of various ethnic minorities in the Nether-
lands directly after the murder and asked their opinions on the murder’s influence on
the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. The great majority of the respon-
dents, both native and foreign, reported that the murder had affected this relationship
and 20% of the respondents of Moroccan origin and 13% of the respondents of Turkish
origin reported that their lives, as well as those of their families, had been affected by
the murder (Gijsberts 2005). The murder also took place amid unfavorable changes in
the political domain for Muslims in the Netherlands. In 2004, member of Parliament
Geert Wilders formed a new political party—the Partij Voor de Vrijheid, (“Party for
Freedom”)—with strong opinions against Muslim immigrants. In addition, a new
immigration law was introduced in March 2006 with stricter requirements for immi-
grants entering the country for the purpose of family reunification/formation, including
a civic integration exam in Dutch. The two political events can clearly be placed in the
context of the changing cultural climate against foreigners, and particularly Muslim
immigrants, in the Netherlands.4
Following the same individuals before and after the wave of terrorist events, we
analyze changes in Muslim immigrants’ integration in the Netherlands relative to those
for non-Muslim immigrants using subjective measures of integration attitudes.5 We find
1 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/457031/html/.
2 Detailed coverage of the 2005 London attacks can be found at the BBC website at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2
/hi/in_depth/uk/2005/london_explosions/default.stm.
3 With the exception of some terrorist conspiracies and threats, there were no high-profile terrorist attacks
in Europe from September 11, 2001, to March 10, 2004 (Nesser 2008). According to the Global Terrorism
Database (2012), the three attacks listed above were the most significant Islamist terrorism attacks in
Europe. For extensive details on fundamentalist Islamic terrorism in Europe over this period, see Bakker
(2006, pp. 3–4).
4 This was also accompanied by a wave of increased xenophobic attitudes among locals. Data from the World
Values Survey show that the share of the Dutch who would not like to have immigrants/foreign workers as
neighbors jumped from about 10% in 2005 to around 20% in 2012. See: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.
org/wvs.jsp.
5 As the social integration process of foreign minorities takes generations, assessing changes in immigrants’
integration over a short period of time would prove difficult using traditional measures of integration such as
language use, importance of religion, attitudes toward intra-marriage, etcetera. Integration attitudes, however,
represent the basis of the integration process and could therefore capture the integration potential. Georgiadis
and Manning (2013) show that immigrants who feel tolerated by natives are more likely to identify with the
host country.
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that Muslim immigrants’ attitudes toward integration into Dutch society became much
more negative than those of non-Muslim immigrants following the terrorist attacks.
This pattern is robust to the inclusion of a large set of controls, such as socio-
demographics, employment status, and length of stay in the Netherlands. The pattern
is also robust after controlling for selection bias. Since our data consist of only two
waves, it is difficult to attribute the decline in the integration pattern of Muslims solely
to the sociopolitical atmosphere associated with terrorism. Other factors could have
affected the speed at which different immigrant groups integrate. To check this
possibility, we exploit the relatively long timeframe during which the data were
collected in the first wave and use the timing of interviews to estimate whether a
declining trend in the integration of Muslims relative to non-Muslims was already
observed prior to the terrorist attacks. This analysis shows no evidence of a decline in
Muslim immigrants’ integration before the terrorist attacks, suggesting that it was the
wave of terrorism and its sociopolitical consequences that caused the change in the
integration pattern of Muslims in the Netherlands.
We also estimate the effect of the attacks on geographic segregation and labor market
outcomes. We find that the geographic segregation of Muslim immigrants increased after
the attacks. This finding is in line with those of Gautier et al. (2009), where housing prices
in Amsterdam declined in neighborhoods with a large share of Muslim immigrants after
the murder of Theo van Gogh. 6 While unemployment and working hours were not
affected by the attacks, on average, our analyses on the heterogeneous effects show that
low-educated Muslims were affected negatively in terms of labor market outcomes and
became more geographically segregated after the attacks, while highly educated Muslims
were affected the most negatively with respect to their integration attitudes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature.
Section 3 explains the empirical strategy. Section 4 describes the data and variables
used in the paper. Section 5 reports the results of the data analyses and describes the
robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the findings and concludes.
2 Related literature
Becker’s theory of taste-based discrimination (Becker 1957) provides a plausible frame-
work for studying the impact of fundamentalist Islamic terrorism on Muslim immigrants.
As a consequence of the Islamist terrorist attacks, locals could develop a (greater) distaste
for Muslims, which induce them to reduce their interaction withMuslims, ignore them, or
commit hate crimes against them in the extreme case (Gould and Klor 2015; Hanes and
Machin 2014). This distaste increases the level of perceived discrimination by Muslim
immigrants and decreases their integration in the host country.7
Based on this framework, an emerging body of economic literature investigates the
impact of Islamist terrorism on different outcomes of Muslim immigrants (e.g., Cornelissen
6 Unlike Gautier et al. (2009), who studied the effect of terrorism on Muslim immigrants at the neighborhood
level, we show changes in the geographic segregation of Muslims using data at the individual level. One
advantage of our approach is the ability to study the heterogeneous effects of the impact of terrorism on
Muslim immigrants.
7 Some studies exploit exogenous shifts in natives’ ethnic preferences to study taste-based discrimination (e.g.,
Michaels and Zhi 2010; Moser 2012) and in-group preference (e.g., Shayo and Zussman 2011).
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and Jirjahn 2012; Gautier et al. 2009; Goel 2010; Hanes and Machin 2014; Johnston and
Lordan 2012; Kaushal et al. 2007; Shannon 2012). 8 The literature shows increasing
discrimination against Muslims as a result of terrorism (Goel 2010; Hanes and Machin
2014), as well as negative impacts of this discrimination onMuslim immigrants’ geographic
segregation (Gautier et al. 2009) and health (Johnston and Lordan 2012). However, the
effect of terrorism on Muslim immigrants’ labor market outcomes is not clear-cut in the
literature. While some studies find that terrorism has had a negative effect on the labor
market position ofMuslims (e.g., Dávila andMora 2005; Kaushal et al. 2007),9 other studies
find little or no effect (e.g., Åslund and Rooth 2005; Braakmann 2010; Shannon 2012).
Others find that only particular groups of Muslims were affected, such as the young (Rabby
and Rodgers 2010, 2011) and the low skilled (Cornelissen and Jirjahn 2012).
The failure of labor market outcomes to measure discrimination could be explained by
the highly regulated nature of the European labor markets (Åslund and Rooth 2005;
Cornelissen and Jirjahn 2012), as well as by immigrants’ participation in networks of the
same ethnic minority. Active participation in these networks is usually associated with
positive labor outcomes (Casey and Dustmann 2010). This suggests that the identification
of immigrants with their home country, as opposed to the host country, could be positively
associated with labor market outcomes. These countervailing mechanisms could explain
why, overall, evidence of the impact of the terrorist attacks on the labor market position of
Muslims is mixed. However, while the impact of terrorism on labor market discrimination
remains inconclusive, Muslims could also be affected in terms of geographic segregation
(Gautier et al. 2009). The dislike of Muslims due to the terrorist attacks could make
natives move out of municipalities with high concentrations of Muslims, while Muslims
could be more eager to move to such areas to obtain social support from being in a
community of the same ethnic or religious background. Both scenarios will lead to higher
levels of segregation among Muslim immigrants.
Moreover, the terrorist attacks could have long-term effects for Muslim migrants.
Gould and Klor (2015) exploit variations across US states in the number of hate crimes
against Muslims in the wake of September 11 and show that September 11 had long-term
effects on intermarriage, fertility, female labor force participation, and English proficiency
among Muslim immigrants. The authors argue that a major goal of terrorist attacks is to
induce a backlash against Muslims to radicalize moderate supporters who live in the same
country as the perpetrators.10 However, despite the growing economic literature on the
integration of Muslim immigrants in western societies (e.g., Adida et al. 2014; Arai et al.
2011; Battu and Zenou 2010; Bisin et al. 2008; Georgiadis and Manning 2011, 2013;
Manning and Roy 2010;Mitrut andWolff 2014), no studies have used a panel structure to
estimate changes in the integration attitudes of Muslim immigrants over time while
8 The impact that large-scale fundamentalist Islamic terrorist attacks have on discrimination is not limited to
the country in which the attacks take place. For example, Schüller (2016) shows that September 11 resulted in
a significant increase in negative attitudes toward immigration and decreased concerns over xenophobic
hostility among the native German population.
9 In a similar vein, Miaari et al. (2012) showed that the second Intifada in 2000 increased job separation rate
for Arab workers in Israel, relative to Jew workers.
10 In addition to this strategic objective for terrorism, the literature discusses several other political objectives
such as changing standpoints of governments (Kydd andWalter 2006), or switching political attitudes of locals
leftwards (Gould and Klor 2010), in addition to economic objectives such as causing large movements of
capital across countries (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2008).
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accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, there is no evidence which groups of
individuals are most affected in terms of their perceived integration.11
While the impact of terrorist attacks on objective outcomes is expected to be more
pronounced for low-educated immigrants (Cornelissen and Jirjahn 2012), discrimination
is more likely to be perceived by highly educated immigrants because of their high
expectations of integration in the host country. Banerjee (2008) indeed finds that immi-
grants’ perceived discrimination is not related to objective measures of income inequity.
The author shows that, in workplace settings, long-term immigrants and highly educated
immigrants perceive discrimination more strongly than new immigrants and low-
educated immigrants, respectively, because of their expectations of equitable treatment.
3 Empirical strategy
To identify the effect of the terrorist attacks in Western Europe, and their sociopolitical
aftermath on the integration of Muslim immigrants, we estimate the equation
Y it ¼ αþ β1 M it þ β2PAt þ β3 Mit  PAt½  þ β4X it þ ui þ εit ð1Þ
where Yit is the integration level of immigrant i at time t, M is a dummy variable that
takes the value one if the respondent is Muslim and zero otherwise, PA is a dummy
variable that takes the value one if the observation is from the second wave of the study
(after the terrorist attacks) and zero otherwise, the parameter β3 for the interaction
between M and PA is our measure of change in Muslims’ integration compared to that
of non-Muslims, Xit is a set of controls, ui is an individual fixed effect (FE) that we
assume to be uncorrelated with the timings of the terrorist attacks, and εit is a time-
varying error term.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
To study the impact of the terrorist attacks on the perceived integration of Muslims, we
use panel data from the Netherlands Kinship Panel Study SPVA (Social Position and
Facilities Use of Ethnic Minorities) survey, which oversamples immigrants from the
four largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands: Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, and
Dutch Antilleans. The data were collected from 13 Dutch cities, in which at least half of
the immigrant population lives (Dykstra et al. 2005, 2012). The panel dataset consists
of two waves. The first wave was collected between April 2002 and October 2003,
while the second was collected between May 2006 and June 2007. 12 The dataset
contains individual information about religion, age, level of education, ethnic group,
11 Goel (2010) estimates changes in perceptions of discrimination among Muslim-looking immigrants in
Australia using a cross section of recently arrived immigrants, making it difficult to account for unobserved
immigrant heterogeneity. In addition, the measures used in her study are limited to binary perceptions of
intolerance and discrimination. Our study goes one step further, beyond perceptions of fair/unfair treatment,
and assesses changes in immigrants’ feeling at ease with natives and attitudes toward living in the host country.
12 The long period over which the data were collected is due to the difficulty in reaching the target groups
(Dykstra et al. 2005, 2012).
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employment status, marital status, year of immigration, and so forth. Furthermore, we
include information about the share of the individuals’ own ethnic groups in the
municipalities in which they live, drawn from Statistics Netherlands.13
The dataset also includes information about immigrants’ attitudes toward integration.
The respondents were asked eight questions on the extent to which they agreed with
each of the following statements: (1) “In the Netherlands foreigners have excellent
opportunities,” (2) “The Dutch are hostile to foreigners,” (3) “In the Netherlands your
rights as a foreigner are respected,” (4) “The Dutch are hospitable to foreigners,” (5) “In
the Netherlands people are indifferent to foreigners,” (6) “Foreigners are treated fairly in
the Netherlands,” (7) “Foreigners face many restrictions in the Netherlands,” and (8)
“The Dutch are open to foreign cultures.” The answers were given on a five-point scale,
ranging from one (“strongly disagree”) to five (“strongly agree”). Respondents were
also asked about their appreciation of living in the Netherlands—(9) “How do you like
living in the Netherlands?” (with answers ranging from one, “very fine,” to five, “very
annoying”)—and their social experience with locals—(10) “Do you feel at ease in the
company of Dutch people?” (with answers on a four-point scale, with one for “no, not at
all,” two for “no, not really,” three for “yes, a little,” and four for “yes, very much so”).14
We use a balanced sample of 432 observations (216 individuals in each wave) for
whom we have full information on all integration attitudes, demographics, and religion.
Of this set, 280 observations (140 individuals in each wave) are for Muslim immigrants
and 152 observations (76 individuals in each wave) are for non-Muslim immigrants.
Table 6 in the Appendix provides an overview of the integration attitudes and variables
used in the study. The table shows that non-Muslim immigrants scored significantly
higher thanMuslims in most of the integration items. In our sample, 56% of non-Muslims
and 41% of Muslims were females. Muslims are more often low educated (i.e., more
likely to have lower secondary education or below).15 While the majority of Muslims
belong to the Turkish and Moroccan ethnic minorities, the majority of non-Muslims
belong to the Surinamese and Dutch Antillean ethnic minorities. Geographic concentra-
tion inmunicipalities (estimated by the share ofmigrants with the same ethnic background
in a municipality) was higher for Muslim than for non-Muslim immigrants. Non-Muslims
were more likely to be employed (65%) than Muslims (53%). In addition, a greater
percentage of Muslims in our sample were married and had children.
Figure 1 shows the changes in integration attitudes for both Muslim and non-Muslim
immigrants between the twowaves of the study (the integration attitudes are standardized for
ease of comparison). The figure shows that, between the two waves, integration attitudes
became more negative for both groups. However, the change is much more pronounced
among Muslims than among non-Muslims. Table 7 in the Appendix summarizes the
changes and shows the difference-in-difference estimates of the integration items. The
difference-in-difference coefficients show that the decline was more significant for Muslims
than for non-Muslims over different measures of integration attitudes.
13 See the Statistics Netherlands website: http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/.
14 The first eight items are used in the sociological literature as a measure of perceived acceptance by the host
country (Huijnk et al. 2012). The scale for items (2), (5), (7), and (9) is reversed so that the higher the value,
the better the outcome in terms of integration.
15 We here follow the definition used in the literature (e.g., Steedman and McIntosh 2001) which defines the
low educated as those who have lower secondary education or below, and the higher educated as those with
upper secondary education or higher.
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We use an integration index constructed by grouping the 10 individual items. This has
the advantage of reducing the likelihood of type I errors (where the result for any single
item is due to chance) and type II errors (the risk of low statistical power) (Clingingsmith
et al. 2009). Following Kling et al. (2007), we estimate an index of the equally weighted
averages of the z-scores of the 10 items. The z-scores are calculated by subtracting the
control group’s (non-Muslims) mean and dividing by the control group’s standard
deviation. Therefore, for the non-Muslims in our sample, each item in the index has
mean zero and standard deviation one.16 Table 7 shows the decline in our integration
index (hereafter, perceived integration) is much more pronounced for Muslims.
5 Data analyses
5.1 Baseline model
To investigate the impact of Islamist terrorism on the integration of Muslims,
we estimate Eq. (1) using a FE and a generalized least squares model with
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Fig. 1 Changes in the integration attitudes
16 An alternative approach is to compute the average effect size across items within the integration index,
using seemingly unrelated regression for the 10 items to estimate the covariance of the effects and then
calculating the mean effect size for the 10 items in a second step (Clingingsmith et al. 2009; Kling and
Liebman 2004). Since we use a consistent number of observations across the 10 items of integration and there
are no regression adjustments, the two approaches give identical results (Kling et al. 2007). Without a
consistent number of observations, the results would remain very similar. The advantage of the average z-
score index used in this paper is that it is much simpler to work with, especially when using panel data (Kling
et al. 2007).
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random effects (RE) clustered on personal identification.17 Table 1 shows the
coefficients of the two models without and with a large set of control variables
(see table footnotes). The table shows that the perceived integration of Muslim
immigrants in the Netherlands decreased significantly after the attacks relative
to the perceived integration of non-Muslim immigrants. This result can be seen
in the interaction coefficients between Muslim and Post-attacks, which are
negative and statistically significant.18 To investigate the possibility that differ-
ences in control variables between Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants could
be driving the results, Table 8 in the Appendix replicates the FE analysis after
controlling for the interaction between being Muslim and all relevant control
variables (column 1). And to account for the possibility that changes in the
control variables over time are driving the change in perceived integration, we
control for the interaction between Post-attacks and all relevant control vari-
ables (column 2). The table shows that both model specifications yield similar
results as the baseline model in Table 1.
We also estimated the model using the individual items of the integration
index. Table 9 in the Appendix shows the interaction coefficients for each of
the 10 items separately. Among the different items, perceptions of excellent
opportunities, fair treatment, openness to foreign cultures, and appreciation of
living in the Netherlands are affected most negatively by the terrorist attacks.
To account for the possibility that the decrease in integration is affected by
extremely positive pre-attack levels of integration attitudes, Table 10 in the
Appendix re-estimates the model after excluding the most positive pre-attack
levels of integration (top 10%). The estimation results remain unchanged.
5.2 Possible trend prior to the terrorist attacks
Some studies show that September 11 was associated with labor market discrimination
against certain minority groups and changed attitudes toward immigrants not only in
the USA but also in other Western countries (e.g., Cornelissen and Jirjahn 2012; Goel
2010; Schüller 2016). Since the period we analyze starts after the September 11 attacks,
the effect we find could be due to a negative trend in perceived integration of Muslim
immigrants that had already set in after September 11, 2001. However, the analysis
17 The Breusch Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test rejects the null hypothesis and therefore suggests the use of
random effects model over OLS.
18 We acknowledge the potential for selection bias due to panel attrition in the dataset; of the 469 respondents
for whom we have information on integration and background characteristics in the first wave, only 216 were
also present in the second wave. To deal with the selection bias, we replicated the analysis after controlling for
Mills ratio using a selection variable that equals one if the individual is observed in the two waves of the study
as our dependent variable in the selection equation. As an exclusion restriction, we used a dummy variable that
takes the value one if the number of missing items in the respondents’ answers to all the questions in the first
wave is above the median and zero otherwise (Huijnk et al. 2012). This variable is used to satisfy the exclusion
restriction, which is possible since the likelihood that a respondent will be absent from the second wave should
be correlated with the number of questions the respondent did not answer in the first wave. (i.e., immigrants
who answered fewer questions in the first wave should be more likely to drop out in the second wave).
However, the number of missing answers should not be correlated with the timing of the terrorist attacks. The
results (that can be obtained from the corresponding author) are similar to those shown in Table 1.
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above (Table 1) does not show strong evidence of differences in integration between
Muslims and non-Muslims before the wave of terrorist attacks in which we are
interested. Furthermore, even if Muslims were less integrated, this would make our
point stronger, since it underestimates our coefficients for the decrease in Muslims’
integration.
However, if a pattern of change in Muslim immigrants’ integration began
before the wave of terrorism of interest (i.e., before March 2004), this would
imply that the change in Muslim immigrants’ attitudes was not a result of the
terrorist attacks but could, instead, be due to endogenous factors that affect the
speed of integration differently for Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants. To
account for this possibility, we exploit the timing of interviews during the first
wave of the dataset to analyze whether Muslims interviewed late in the first
wave reported lower integration attitudes than those interviewed earlier. If such
a pattern is already observed before the terrorist attacks, it would be difficult to
attribute the decline in the integration of Muslim immigrants to the terrorist
attacks. Since the first wave of the data was collected over quite a long
timeframe, a trend could be identified.
Table 1 Change in the integration of Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants after the terrorist attacks, balanced
panel data
Perceived integration
FE RE
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Muslim – – −0.116 0.038
(0.076) (0.198)
Post-attacks −0.223c −0.347 −0.223c −0.236c
(0.053) (0.288) (0.053) (0.060)
Muslim × Post-attacks −0.287c −0.323c −0.287c −0.313c
(0.100) (0.107) (0.100) (0.109)
Constant 0.071c −0.256 0.111b −0.135
(0.023) (1.311) (0.048) (0.278)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 432 432 432 432
Number of individuals 216 216 216 216
Perceived integration is measured by an index of the equally weighted averages of the z-scores (based on the
mean and standard deviation of the non-Muslim group) of the 10 integration items. The variable Muslim is a
dummy variable for being Muslim and Post-attacks takes the value one if the observation is from the second
wave (after the terrorist attacks) and zero otherwise. Controls include employment status, education, marital
status, number of children, length of stay in the Netherlands (squared), and regional dummies. In the RE
model, controls also include time-invariant variables on gender, and ethnic group. Respondents’ age is
removed because of potential collinearity with length of stay in the Netherlands. However, adding the variable
yields similar results. Robust standard errors are in parentheses
b Significant at 5%
c Significant at 1%
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Figure 2 shows the unconditional trends in the integration of Muslim and
non-Muslim immigrants in the two waves of the study. The graph shows that,
during the first wave of the survey, the integration of Muslims was increasing
relative to that of non-Muslims. This result suggests no pre-trend in the relative
decline in the integration of Muslims. The figure also clearly shows a drop in
the integration for the two groups of immigrants in the second wave, compared
to the first wave, with a far more pronounced drop for Muslim immigrants.
However, the integration seems to slightly recover during the second wave for
the two groups.
Table 11 in the Appendix shows the coefficients for the regression of
integration on the time of the interviews, measured in quarters, during the first
wave (column 1) and second wave (column 2) of the study. The table shows
that our finding that there was no negative pre-trend in the integration of
Muslims compared to non-Muslims is robust to controlling for all relevant
information.
5.3 Heterogeneous effects
In this section, we examine the extent of heterogeneity in the decline of
integration of Muslim immigrants with respect to the pre-attacks covariates of
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Table 2 Change in the integration of Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants after the terrorist attacks, FE
estimates with heterogeneity by gender, age, education, geographic concentration, labor market status, and
religiosity
Perceived integration
Variables (1) (2)
(A) Gender Men Women
Muslim × Post-attacks −0.310b −0.301a
(0.149) (0.167)
Observations 214 218
Number of Individuals 107 109
(B) Age ≤ 40 >40
Muslim × Post-attacks −0.432c −0.160
(0.146) (0.177)
Observations 200 232
Number of Individuals 100 116
(C) Education High Low
Muslim × Post-attacks −0.655c −0.216
(0.150) (0.143)
Observations 202 230
Number of Individuals 101 115
(D) Labor market status Employed Unemployed
Muslim × Post-attacks −0.410c −0.186
(0.132) (0.181)
Observations 256 176
Number of Individuals 128 88
(E) Geographic concentration High (above median) Low (below median)
Muslim × Post-attacks −0.309b −0.392c
(0.150) (0.142)
Observations 216 216
Number of individuals 108 108
(F) Religiosity Less religious More religious
Post-attacks −0.633c −0.483b
(0.133) (0.176)
Observations 92 60
Number of individuals 46 30
Controls, as in Table 1. The low-education group is the group with elementary education, lower vocational
education, or lower secondary education. The high-education group is the group with intermediate vocational
education, intermediate and upper general secondary education, higher vocational education, or university
education. The employed variable takes the value one if the individual was employed in the first wave and
zero otherwise and religiosity is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the Muslim respondent went to
the mosque frequently and zero if the respondent hardly went to the mosque. We limit the analysis of
religiosity to Muslims. Therefore, the coefficient for Post-attacks will capture the changes for less religious
Muslims (column 1) and more religiousMuslims (column 2). For all estimations, we use the pre-attack level of
the variable as a basis for the division. Robust standard errors are in parentheses
a Significant at 10%
b Significant at 5%
c Significant at 1%
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gender, age, level of education, labor market status, geographic segregation, and
degree of religiosity. Table 2 shows the results of the FE estimations from
Table 1 for split samples by gender (panel A), age (panel B), education level:
intermediate secondary education or above vs. lower secondary education or
below (panel C), labor market status: employed vs. unemployed (panel D),
geographic concentration: above vs. below median share of migrants with same
ethnic background (panel E), and degree of religiosity: if the Muslim respon-
dent goes to the mosque frequently vs. hardly (panel F). The decrease in the
integration of Muslims seems to be more pronounced for male, young, highly
educated, employed, and less religious Muslims. Muslims living in areas with
lower levels of geographic concentration are also more likely to feel less
integrated after the terrorist attacks compared to Muslims living in more
segregated areas, although this difference is not statistically significant. These
findings show that Muslim immigrants with high potential for integration were
affected the most negatively. This result could be explained in light of their
high expectations of integration in the host country. While this group of
Muslims is more likely to have expected to be dealt with similarly to natives
(Banerjee 2008), deviations from this expectation due to perceived discrimina-
tion could have led them to feel unintegrated within their host country. More-
over, those who are employed interact more often with natives than the non-
Table 3 Change in geographic concentration, unemployment, and working hours after the terrorist attack, FE
Geographic concentration Unemployment Log working hours
(1) (2) (3)
Muslim – – –
Post-attacks 0.763b −0.127 −0.155
(0.329) (0.169) (0.105)
Muslim × Post-attacks 0.199c 0.064 −0.026
(0.079) (0.050) (0.038)
Constant 0.061c −0.343 2.934c
(0.014) (0.735) (0.493)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 432 432 220
Number of individuals 216 216 110
Unemployment is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the respondent is unemployed and zero
otherwise. Log working hours refer to log of actual working hours. Geographic concentration is the share of
people with the same ethnic background in the municipality where the respondent lives. Controls include
education, marital status, number of children, length of stay in the Netherlands (squared), and regional
dummies. The working hour estimates are conditional on being employed. Replicating the analysis using a
sample that included observations with zero working hours gives similar results. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses
b Significant at 5%
c Significant at 1%
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employed and are therefore more likely to encounter harassments and perceive
discrimination.
5.4 Labor market outcomes and geographic segregation
In this section, we estimate the effect of the terrorist attacks on Muslim
immigrants’ geographic concentration, unemployment, and working hours. 19
Table 3 shows that the geographic segregation of Muslim immigrants relative
to non-Muslim immigrants significantly increased over time. The share of
people with the same ethnic background increased by about 0.2 percentage
points for Muslims compared to non-Muslims after the attacks. The table
further shows that unemployment and working hours of Muslims were not
negatively affected by the terrorist attacks. However, the heterogeneous treat-
ment effects for geographic concentration and labor market outcomes (Table 4)
show that the effect of the terrorist attacks seems to be more pronounced for
19 We could not use wages here because our dataset does not contain a consistent measure of labor income
across the two panel waves.
Table 4 Change in geographic concentration, unemployment, and working hours after the terrorist attacks,
FE estimates with heterogeneity by gender, age, and education
Variables Gender Age Education
Male Female ≤40 >40 Low educ. High educ.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Geographic concentration
Muslim × Post-attacks 0.324a 0.320c 0.154 0.201a 0.327c 0.102
(0.180) (0.070) (0.147) (0.117) (0.076) (0.140)
Observations 214 218 200 232 230 202
Number of individuals 107 109 100 116 115 101
Unemployment
Muslim × Post-attacks 0.130a −0.003 0.032 0.071 0.163a 0.004
(0.069) (0.068) (0.073) (0.074) (0.083) (0.049)
Observations 214 218 200 232 230 202
Number of individuals 107 109 100 116 115 101
Working hours
Muslim × Post-attacks −0.025 −0.035 −0.044 0.027 −0.023 −0.031
(0.044) (0.088) (0.058) (0.045) (0.049) (0.051)
Observations 136 84 120 100 98 122
Number of individuals 68 42 60 50 49 61
See Table 3. The controls are as in Table 3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses
a Significant at 10%
c Significant at 1%
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Table 5 Relation between the change in perceived integration and the intention to return to one’s native
country, marginal effects based on probit model
Variables Intention to return to native country
Change in perceived integration −0.113b
(0.048)
Pre-attacks perceived integration −0.108a
(0.059)
Muslim −0.141
(0.140)
Ref: Employed
Unemployed −0.135
(0.091)
Housewife −0.028
(0.107)
Disabled −0.077
(0.091)
Student 0.073
(0.247)
Retired 0.072
(0.135)
Female −0.023
(0.065)
Ref: Unmarried
Married −0.018
(0.089)
Divorced −0.092
(0.085)
Widowed −0.050
(0.163)
Number of children −0.004
(0.019)
Length of stay in NL 0.020
(0.014)
Length of stay in NL (squared) −0.036
(0.029)
Highly educated −0.051
(0.062)
Geographic concentration 0.017
(0.013)
Observations 216
Based on data from the second wave of the survey. Intention to return to native country is measured by a
dummy variable that takes the value one if the respondent is planning to go back to the country of origin for
good and zero otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses
a Significant at 10%
b Significant at 5%
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low-educated Muslims, who witnessed a significant relative increase in geo-
graphic concentration and unemployment.20
5.5 Integration attitudes and return plans
To show the relevance of attitudes in assessing immigrant integration, we
estimate the relationship between perceived integration and the intention to
permanently return to the native country. Respondents in the second wave of
the survey were asked, “Do you plan to go back to your country of origin for
good?”. Twenty-three percent of all respondents (18% of Muslims and 26% of
non-Muslims) reported a willingness to re-migrate permanently. We estimate a
probit model in which the outcome variable is the intention to permanently re-
migrate to the country of origin, and the main regressors are the change in
perceived integration across the two waves of the study and the pre-attacks
level of integration, in addition to relevant control variables.21 Table 5 reports
the marginal effects and shows that decline in perceived integration (and pre-
attacks level of perceived integration) are significantly associated with higher
intention to permanently re-migrate to the country of origin. However, unem-
ployment and geographic concentration are not significantly related to the
intention to re-migrate to the country of origin. This result suggests that this
subjective measure of integration could be a strong better predictor of return
migration.22
6 Conclusion
We use panel data from the Netherlands that oversample the four largest ethnic
minorities in the country (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, and Dutch Antilleans) to
analyze the integration patterns of Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants before and
shortly after a violent wave of Islamist terrorist attacks hit Western Europe. This wave
of attacks began with the Madrid bombings in March 2004 and extended to the London
bombings in July 2005. The assassination of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam by an
Islamic fanatic of Moroccan origin took place in the middle of this wave, triggering
nationwide outrage and increasing discrimination against Muslims in the Netherlands
(Gautier et al. 2009).
20 To examine pre-trends, we also estimated a model in which we regress geographic segregation, unemploy-
ment, and working hours separately on the time of the interview during the first wave interacted with a Muslim
dummy. We find no significant pre-trends in Muslim immigrants’ outcomes relative to non-Muslims.
21 About 32% of the respondents (36% of Muslims and 30% of non-Muslims) witnessed a decline in their
perceived integration across the two waves.
22 The control variables shown are from the second wave. However, estimation results do not change when we
control for the pre-attack levels of the control variables or the changes in the variables between the two waves.
To capture any differences in the relationship between the change in perceived integration and the intention to
permanently return to the native country between Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants, we have re-estimated
the model controlling for the interaction between being a Muslim and the change in perceived integration. The
coefficient of the interaction term shows no significant differences between the two groups, suggesting that the
two groups of migrants do not respond differently to a decline in integration.
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We show that Muslim immigrants’ attitudes toward integration became far more
negative after the terrorist attacks than did those of non-Muslim immigrants. This
pattern holds after including a large set of control variables and accounting for selection
bias and is not driven by any negative trend in the integration of Muslim immigrants
prior to the attacks. While the integration attitudes of high-educated Muslims were
affected the most negatively by the terrorist attacks, low-educated Muslim immigrants
were affected more negatively in terms of geographic concentration and
unemployment.
The difference in the impact of terrorist attacks on geographic concentration between
low-educated and high-educated Muslims could be due to the fact that low-educated
immigrants are less often employed (or became more unemployed due to the attacks)
than those who are highly educated and, therefore, (became) less constrained to move
geographically. Moreover, the decline in house prices in areas with high concentrations
of Muslim immigrants could be another driving force for low-educated Muslims to
move to these areas. This increase in the geographic concentration of low-educated
Muslims after the attacks could be a buffer that mitigates the effect of terrorism on their
perceived integration, since they could obtain social support from being in a commu-
nity of the same ethnic background. This could explain why low-educated migrants do
not perceive discrimination as much as the highly educated do.
Despite the difficulty to claim causality, the paper provides strong suggestive
evidence, using a panel data structure, that terrorism committed by Muslim
fundamentalists, and its negative sociopolitical aftermath, could negatively af-
fect the attitudes of moderate and high-educated Muslims toward integration in
Western societies. We further find that integration attitudes are negatively
associated with migrants’ intention to return to their native country. This result
emphasizes the relevance of integration attitudes. Given that migrants who
arguably have strong potential for integration (i.e., the highly educated,
employed, and less religious) witnessed the greatest decline in integration
attitudes, they are the most likely to permanently re-migrate to their country
of origin. This suggests that policy makers should acknowledge that the outrage
against Muslims in the aftermath of the Islamist terrorist attacks has a negative
impact on the prospective stay of the most productive Muslim immigrants in
the host country, which could have negative economic implications for the
knowledge economy of Western societies.
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Appendix
Table 6 Descriptive statistics
Variable Non-Muslim Muslim P value
Integration items
Excellent opportunities for foreigners 3.11 3.25 0.272
No hostility against foreigners 3.49 3.30 0.043
Rights of foreigners are respected 3.39 3.13 0.013
Netherlands is hospitable to foreigners 3.54 3.09 0.000
People in the Netherlands are not indifferent to migrants 3.02 2.94 0.389
In the Netherlands foreigners are treated fairly 3.33 3.14 0.066
In the Netherlands foreigners are not restricted 3.27 2.66 0.000
The Netherlands is open to foreign cultures 3.65 3.53 0.237
Feeling at ease with Dutch natives 3.90 3.79 0.000
Appreciation of living in the Netherlands 3.57 3.18 0.165
Perceived integration index 0.00 −0.26 0.000
Demographic variables
Female 0.56 0.41 0.002
Age 44.05 41.63 0.041
Highly educated (Intermediate secondary or higher) 0.45 0.24 0.000
Length of stay in the Netherlands 21.41 21.44 0.973
Employment status
Employed 0.65 0.53 0.012
Unemployed 0.06 0.08 0.471
Housewife 0.10 0.18 0.009
Disabled 0.09 0.12 0.403
Student 0.04 0.02 0.354
Retired 0.06 0.07 0.749
Working hours 37.10 37.74 0.558
Ethnic minority
Turkish 0.00 0.58 0.000
Moroccan 0.00 0.26 0.000
Surinamese 0.40 0.12 0.000
Dutch Antilleans 0.60 0.04 0.000
Share of ethnic group in municipality
(geographic concentration) in percentage points
3.65 5.08 0.000
Marital status
Never married 0.04 0.04 0.000
Married 0.42 0.80 0.000
Divorced 0.25 0.14 0.001
Widowed 0.28 0.03 0.306
Number of children 2.20 2.62 0.018
280 152
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Table 7 Difference-in-difference estimates of integration attitudes before and after the terrorist attacks
Variables Non-Muslims Muslims Diff. in diff.
Before After Before After
N = 76 N = 76 N = 140 N = 140
(1) Excellent opportunities for foreigners 3.26 2.96 3.79 2.71 −0.78c
(1.14) (1.21) (1.14) (1.23)
(2) No hostility against foreigners 3.64 3.34 3.47 3.12 −0.06
(0.84) (1.02) (0.97) (0.89)
(3) Rights of foreigners are respected 3.47 3.30 3.41 2.86 −0.38a
(0.88) (1.01) (1.01) (1.15)
(4) NL is hospitable to foreigners 3.77 3.31 3.34 2.83 −0.06
(0.93) (1.13) (1.01) (1.17)
(5) People in NL are not indifferent to migrants 3.01 3.04 2.96 2.92 −0.06
(1.00) (0.89) (1.020 (0.99)
(6) In NL foreigners are treated fairly 3.43 3.22 3.54 2.75 −0.58c
(0.92) (0.95) (0.880 (1.02)
(7) In NL foreigners are not restricted 3.39 3.16 2.74 2.58 0.07
(1.00) (1.03) (1.080 (1.09)
(8) NL is open to foreign cultures 3.69 3.61 3.82 3.25 −0.49b
(0.89) (0.98) (0.90) (1.12
(9) Feeling at ease with Dutch natives 3.67 3.47 3.36 3.01 −0.14
(0.48) (0.69) (0.69) (0.76)
(10) Appreciation of living in the Netherlands 3.99 3.82 3.99 3.59 −0.23
(0.74) (0.74) (0.84) (0.98)
(11) Perceived integration 0.11 −0.11 −0.004 −0.51 −0.29b
(0.57) (0.64) (0.51) (0.70)
Diff. in diff. = (Muslimafter − Muslimbefore) − (non-Muslimafter – non-Muslimbefore). NL = the Netherlands.
Standard deviations are in parentheses
a Significant at 10%
b Significant at 5%
c Significant at 1%
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Table 8 Change in the integration of Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants after the terrorist attacks, FE
model
Variables Perceived integration
(1) (2)
Muslim – –
Post-attacks −0.502a −0.118
(0.297) (0.383)
Muslim × Post-attacks −0.284b −0.299b
(0.118) (0.124)
Constant −1.455 −0.550
(1.361) (1.467)
Muslim dummy interacted with all controls Yes No
Pre-attacks dummy interacted with all controls No Yes
Observations 432 432
Number of individuals 216 216
Perceived integration is measured by an index of the equally weighted averages of the z-scores (based on the
mean and standard deviation of the non-Muslim group) of the 10 integration items. The variable Muslim is a
dummy variable for being Muslim and Post-attacks takes the value one if the observation is from the second
wave (after the terrorist attacks) and zero otherwise. Column 1 controls for the interaction between being a
Muslim and all the controls. Column 3 controls for the interaction between Post-attacks and all the controls.
The interacted control variables are gender, employment status, education, marital status, ethnic group, number
of children, length of stay in the Netherlands (squared), and regional dummies. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses
a Significant at 10%
b Significant at 5%
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Table 9 Change in the integration attitudes of Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants after terrorist attacks,
separate estimations for each item in the integration index
Variables (1)
FE
(1) Excellent opportunities for foreigners
Muslim × Post-attacks −0.869c
(0.234)
(2) No hostility against foreigners
Muslim × Post-attacks −0.071
(0.192)
(3) Rights of foreigners are respected
Muslim × Post-attacks −0.386b
(0.179)
(4) NL is hospitable to foreigners
Muslim × Post-attacks 0.014
(0.204)
(5) People in NL are not indifferent to migrants
Muslim × Post-attacks −0.089
(0.212)
(6) In NL foreigners are treated fairly
Muslim × Post-attacks −0.667c
(0.184)
(7) In NL foreigners are not restricted
Muslim × Post-attacks −0.064
(0.196)
(8) NL is open to foreign cultures
Muslim × Post-attacks −0.510b
(0.199)
(9) Feeling at ease with Dutch natives
Muslim × Post-attacks −0.151
(0.128)
(10) Appreciation of living in the Netherlands
Muslim × Post-attacks −0.273b
(0.136)
Controls Yes
Observations 432
Number of individuals 216
The controls are as in Table 1. The variable Muslim is a dummy variable for being Muslim and Post-attacks
takes the value one if the observation is from the second wave (after the terrorist attacks) and zero otherwise.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses
b Significant at 5%
c Significant at 1%
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Table 10 Change in the integration of Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants after the terrorist attacks
excluding extremely high pre-attacks levels of integration
Variables Perceived integration
(1) (2)
Muslim – –
Post-attacks −0.193c −0.412
(0.058) (0.297)
Muslim × Post-attacks −0.235b −0.268b
(0.101) (0.108)
Constant −0.034 −0.805
(0.024) (1.294)
Observations 384 384
R2 0.172 0.280
Number of individuals 192 192
The controls are as in Table 1. The highest 10% in terms of the pre-attack level of the integration index is
excluded. Perceived integration is measured by an index of the equally weighted averages of the z-scores
(based on the mean and standard deviation of the non-Muslim group) of the 10 integration items. The variable
Muslim is a dummy variable for being Muslim and Post-attacks takes the value one if the observation is from
the second wave (after the terrorist attacks) and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are in parentheses
a Significant at 10%
b Significant at 5%
c Significant at 1%
Table 11 Trends in integration before and after the attacks, OLS estimates
Variables Perceived integration
(1) (2)
Before After
Muslim −0.444 −0.093
(0.271) (0.320)
Time of interview (in quarters) −0.040 0.187c
(0.050) (0.060)
Muslim × Time of interview 0.114 −0.109
(0.085) (0.104)
Constant −0.051 −1.331c
(0.209) (0.338)
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 202 212
R2 0.126 0.184
The time of the interview is measured in quarters. The number of observations is slightly smaller, since we
have no information on the timing for 18 interviews. The controls include gender, employment status,
education, marital status, number of children, length of stay in the Netherlands (squared), and regional
dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses
c Significant at 1%
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